Marquette University Law School

Marquette Law Scholarly Commons
Faculty Publications

Faculty Scholarship

1-1-2010

Why Do We Need a Lawyer?: An Empirical Study
of Divorce Cases
Judith G. McMullen
Marquette University Law School, judith.mcmullen@marquette.edu

Debra Oswald
Marquette University, debra.oswald@marquette.edu

Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.law.marquette.edu/facpub
Part of the Law Commons
Publication Information
Judith G. McMullen & Debra Oswald, Why Do We Need a Lawyer?: An Empirical Study of Divorce
Cases, 12 J.L. & Fam. Stud. 57 (2010)
Repository Citation
McMullen, Judith G. and Oswald, Debra, "Why Do We Need a Lawyer?: An Empirical Study of Divorce Cases" (2010). Faculty
Publications. Paper 85.
http://scholarship.law.marquette.edu/facpub/85

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty Scholarship at Marquette Law Scholarly Commons. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Faculty Publications by an authorized administrator of Marquette Law Scholarly Commons. For more information, please contact
megan.obrien@marquette.edu.

WHY DO WE NEED A LAWYER?: AN EMPIRICAL STUDY OF
DIVORCE CASES
Judith G. McMullen*
Debra Oswald**
I. INTRODUCTION
There is a quiet revolution going on in divorce courts throughout America:
many divorce litigants are foregoing lawyers and handling their divorces by
themselves. This trend creates certain problems for a legal system that has been
largely structured on the assumption that cases will be resolved at a trial—or in
pre-trial negotiations—in which lawyers are the vehicles for advancing the
interests of the litigants. Judges, practicing lawyers and legal scholars have
addressed how best to handle what appears to be ever-increasing numbers of pro se
divorce litigants and various approaches are being implemented in many states.
Special forms and information packets are offered to divorcing couples, online
services are available, and judges devote a lot of time and energy trying to help
floundering divorce litigants without losing the impartiality that is required from
the bench.1 Practicing lawyers may lament the potential loss of clients, although
lawyers also may conclude that the exodus from their offices is really the result of
poor people opting for self-representation. This characterization of the
phenomenon allows lawyers to rationalize the loss of business as the loss of
unprofitable business they did not really want.
Here is the story as many lawyers tell it: people who have little income and
few assets may conclude that a do-it-yourself divorce is a good option. These folks
may be disadvantaged in custody situations, but this cannot be helped. Custody
problems can be resolved in court-based mediation without the couple having
separate attorneys anyway. However, divorcing couples with decent incomes,
significant amounts of property or minor children whose custody might be
disputed will gravitate towards lawyers. While a few people of means will opt to
proceed with their divorces pro se, it is generally agreed that this is not a good
*
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1
See, e.g., Welcome to the Wisconsin Court System Self-Help Family Web Site,
https://prosefamily.wicourts.gov/pages/welcome.html;jsessionid=FDDA7A67AF147170A
D60246D7C4DC00A (last visited Sept. 23, 2009) (a Wisconsin court’s link that allows
divorcing couples to access divorce materials from their counties of residence); see also
Carolyn D. Schwarz, Student Note, Pro se Divorce Litigants: Frustrating the Traditional
Role of the Trial Court Judge and Court Personnel, 42 FAM. CT. REV. 655 passim (2004).
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idea. In other words, conventional wisdom in the legal profession says that divorce
litigants are better off with lawyers and significantly disadvantaged without
lawyers. Since relatively poor people are perceived as having less to lose, their
financial inability to obtain lawyers is tolerated by the system. Is this version
accurate?
There has been some study of self-representation by litigants in various
contexts, including divorce, and we have some knowledge about levels of selfrepresentation and the reasons behind it.2 We know, for example, that many
divorce cases involve at least one pro se litigant.3 We also know that divorce
litigants choose self-representation for non-financial as well as financial reasons.4
We know that many people who work in the court system, including lawyers and
judges, are troubled by the large influx of pro se litigants.5 There is, however,
much about the pro se explosion in divorce cases that is not well understood. We
do not know whether or not the increase in pro se divorce litigants is a good thing
or a bad thing from the client’s perspective. Lawyers tend to theorize that pro se
divorce litigants would be better off if they had legal counsel, but there has been
little research on that point.
Why do people choose to represent themselves in a divorce? Is it purely a
question of economics, or do people avoid lawyers for other reasons (as has been
suggested by some research)? What about the perception of the legal profession
that self-represented divorce litigants are at a disadvantage? Are divorce litigants
better off when they are represented by legal counsel?
This article attempts to address some of these issues by drawing on empirical
data. We set out to examine divorcing couples within a wide range of incomes, and
who are living in a county with urban, suburban and rural communities. Thus, we
selected Waukesha County, Wisconsin; a county adjacent to Milwaukee,
Wisconsin. We believe that by studying a specific population with such diverse
levels of income and living arrangements we have taken a snapshot of how choices
about lawyer representation during the divorce process are affecting average
Americans. We examined a random sample of 567 divorce cases initiated in 2005.
In an attempt to identify possible reasons for a decision to proceed pro se, we
2

See, e.g., AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, STANDING COMMITTEE ON THE DELIVERY
OF LEGAL SERVICES, RESPONDING TO THE NEEDS OF THE SELF-REPRESENTED DIVORCE
LITIGANT (A.B.A. Ass’n 1994) [hereinafter ABA 1994 REPORT]. By the early 1990s, a
majority of parties were self-represented in some jurisdictions. Id. at 5-7. The ABA 1994
REPORT noted that persons were more likely to self-represent if they earned less than
$50,000 per year and if the case was “simple,” such as when there were no children
involved. Id. at 9-10.
3
Id. at 6-8.
4
See, e.g., id. at 9 (“[More] than 20% of the pro se litigants studied said they could
afford a lawyer.”).
5
See generally Schwarz, supra note 1 (describing how the judicial system erects
barriers to helping self-represented litigants: for example, judges can’t give too much help
lest they lose their impartiality, and court staff are prohibited from giving legal advice).
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examined the relationship between various factors (such as age, income level or
gender) and pro se status. We also attempted to examine the question of whether
pro se litigants are worse off than those represented by legal counsel. The
difficulty of defining success in the context of divorce litigation makes it especially
hard to assess the impact of having attorney representation as opposed to
proceeding pro se. For reasons discussed in detail later, we looked at two factors:
the correlation between representation status and the likelihood of maintenance
awards, and the correlation between representation status and the length of the
divorce case.
Our data confirms the conventional wisdom that many individuals seeking a
divorce elect to proceed without a lawyer: in our sample 43.9% of husbands and
37.7% of the wives chose to represent themselves in their divorce cases.6 Our data
also showed that both husbands and wives tended to employ attorneys when
certain factors, such as minor children, a longer marriage, or higher husband’s
income, made the divorce more complex.7 This suggests that divorce litigants have
good, common sense notions about when self-representation is feasible and when it
is not. It also suggests that pro se divorce litigants may not be as disadvantaged as
sometimes is feared, because they may indeed be perfectly capable of handling the
mechanics of relatively “simple” divorces, even though they may need
professional help when more complicated legal issues are involved.
Our attempts to measure the effect of lawyers on divorce litigants who had
them yielded mixed results. Our data showed that divorces tended to take longer
when the litigants were represented by lawyers. This extra time is likely partly or
mostly due to the greater complexity of issues in cases where lawyers were
employed, but it is also possible that lawyers increase the length of the process
either deliberately or by virtue of their characteristic methods of practice.
Similarly, we found that spousal support and family support were more frequently
awarded in divorces where either the wife, or both parties, had legal counsel. We
also found, as would be expected under the laws of Wisconsin and elsewhere, that
maintenance awards were strongly associated with higher husband income, and
longer marriages. Since higher income and longer marriages were also associated
with the hiring of divorce counsel, we cannot say for sure whether lawyers make
maintenance more likely or whether clients who are likely maintenance payers or
receivers are more likely to seek and hire lawyers.
Ultimately, we believe our data suggests that lawyers are most utilized to deal
with the more complex aspects of divorce, and may be less necessary for the
routine procedural matters that many clients handle themselves. It may also be the
case, although our research could not measure this, that lawyers serve a primary
role that is more psychological than mechanical, at least for some clients. This may
have important repercussions for lawyer training, as well as for the construction of
user-friendly family court systems.

6
7

See infra tbl.1, app. A.
See infra Part III.B.
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Before describing our methodology and data, Part II of this article discusses
the history of lawyer involvement in divorce cases in the United States, and
describes previous research that has been performed on pro se litigants,
particularly in the context of divorce. Part III of the article discusses the
methodology and findings of our review of 567 divorce cases filed in Waukesha
County, Wisconsin in 2005. Part IV discusses some of the possible implications of
our findings, particularly for lawyer training and practice.
II. THE HISTORY OF LAWYER INVOLVEMENT IN DIVORCE
For much of American history, divorce was rare and available only to a
wealthy few.8 In A History of American Law, Lawrence Friedman recounts that the
American colonies initially followed the tradition of England, which was
essentially a “divorceless society” where ordinary, unhappy couples were only able
to obtain a legal separation or, in rare cases, a legislative bill of divorce.9 After
Independence, Northern states were quicker to adopt divorce laws than Southern
states, with general divorce laws replacing private divorce laws by the end of the
19th century.10 Friedman suggests that the change was driven not only by changes
in the nature of marriage, but also by the need of the growing American middle
class to clearly establish who owned family property.11 This movement to easier
divorce laws had its opponents, however, with many devout people opposing it as
a symptom of moral decay in society.12 Thus, according to Friedman, these early
“[d]ivorce laws were a kind of compromise. In general, the law never recognized
full, free consensual divorce. It became simpler to get a divorce than in the past;
but divorce was not routine or automatic.”13
Once private bills of divorce were extinct, the state laws that evolved made
divorce available only to “innocent” parties who could prove fault on the part of
the other spouse.14 Arguments claiming “fault” and defenses thereto were based on
complex doctrines, and the claims had to be proven by specific evidence. Typical
fault-based grounds for divorce included adultery, cruelty, and desertion.15

8

LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW 142-44 (3d ed.,
Touchstone 2005).
9
Id.
10
Id. at 142-44.
11
Id. at 144-45.
12
Id. at 144.
13
Id. at 145.
14
The fault-based system is an adversarial model, where the husband and wife sue
each other in court. “[D]ivorces could not be consensual and a divorce could be defended
and defeated because of the conduct of the plaintiff (the moving or petitioning party).”
SANFORD N. KATZ, FAMILY LAW IN AMERICA 78 (Oxford Univ. Press 2003).
15
See generally LESLIE JOAN HARRIS ET AL., FAMILY LAW 301-03 (3d ed., Aspen
Publishers 2005) (listing and describing adultery, cruelty, desertion and impotence as
possible grounds for divorce).
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Connivance,16 collusion,17 and condonation18 were typical defenses. If both
spouses were deemed to be at fault, the doctrine of recrimination stated that they
could not obtain a divorce at all, since there was no innocent party deserving of a
remedy.19 These defenses supported the old English adages: “one must do equity to
receive equity” and “one must come into court with clean hands.”20
The esoteric and complex nature of the necessary claims made it almost a
necessity to hire a lawyer to provide guidance through the process. Unfortunately,
the confining nature of the fault system created a system where a lawyer’s
expertise was frequently employed to get around the divorce laws. Although the
law refused to recognize divorce by mutual agreement, by the end of the 19th
century, “the vast majority of divorce cases were empty charades. Both parties
wanted the divorce; or were at least willing to concede it to the other party. Even in
states with rigid statutes, collusion was a way of life in divorce court.”21 Lawyers
helped clients seek divorces in jurisdictions with more liberal laws, or helped the
couple collude to manufacture evidence necessary to establish grounds for divorce,
such as cruelty, desertion or adultery.22
A system of exclusively fault-based divorce laws remained in effect in the
United States until the late 1960s, despite the fact that collusive divorce had been
16

KATZ, supra note 14, at 78 (“[C]onsenting to or being involved with the ground for
divorce, particularly adultery . . . .”).
17
Id. (“[A]greement by the couple to commit the act, which will support the ground
for divorce.”).
18
Id. (“[F]orgiveness for the wrong.”).
19
Id.
20
Id.
21
FRIEDMAN, supra note 8, at 380.
22
Id. at 380-81, 577-78.
Most divorces in fact were collusive. The wife filed a lawsuit, told her sad
story of abuse, neglect, desertion, or philandering; and the husband said nothing,
did nothing, filed no papers, made no defense. The judge then granted the
divorce, by default. In most states, the sad story was about cruelty or desertion.
In New York, the sad story had to be a story about adultery. Here a cottage
industry of imitation adultery sprang up. There were women who made a living
pretending to be “the other woman.” A man checked into a hotel, and went to
his room. The woman appeared. The two of them got partly or totally undressed.
Suddenly, and miraculously, a photographer appeared, and took their picture.
The man then handed over cash to the woman; she thanked him and left. The
damning photograph somehow found its way into court, as “evidence” of
adultery. The judges, of course, were not fools. They knew what was going on.
They rarely bothered to ask how a photographer just happened to barge into the
love nest and take pictures. Usually, they said nothing and did nothing. The title
of a magazine article from 1934 tells the story in a nutshell: “I Was the
Unknown Blonde in 100 New York Divorces.
Id. (magazine article identified in Note, Collusive and Consensual Divorce and the New
York Anomaly, 36 COLUM. L. REV. 1121, 1131 (1936)).
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pervasive since the late 19th century.23 Until that time, the corrupt and largely
sham fault-based system represented an uneasy compromise between the rising
demand for divorce, and the concerns of pious people to preserve what they
perceived as a moral and tradition-based society.24
In 1969, California became the first state to adopt a no-fault divorce statute,25
and by 2001 all fifty American states had added no-fault provisions to their divorce
laws.26 In the majority of states, no-fault and fault divorce continue to coexist as
options.27 Perhaps the key feature of no-fault divorce is that it makes it possible for
one spouse to obtain a divorce, even without the consent or cooperation of the
other spouse.28
As no-fault divorce became more widely available, attitudes towards divorce
changed as well. Divorce rates began to soar at about the same time divorces
became easier to obtain; although whether one of these realities caused the other
has been the subject of considerable debate. Some scholars argue that no-fault
divorce laws were a key factor in the increase in the American divorce rate. For
example, economist Leora Friedberg examined data in all fifty states, and
compared the trends in each state both before and after the adoption of unilateral
divorce laws. She concluded that the laws themselves resulted in a significant
increase in divorces.29 Similarly, Margaret F. Brinig and F.H. Buckley have
claimed that divorce rates are higher in states with no-fault laws because divorce
under a fault-based system penalizes fault, and thus deters people from seeking
divorce.30
23

Id. at 145.
Id. at 381.
25
MARY ANN GLENDON, ABORTION
Univ. Press 1987).
26
KATZ, supra note 14, at 80.
27
Id. at 79.
28
FRIEDMAN, supra note 8, at 579.
24

AND

DIVORCE

IN

WESTERN LAW 67 (Harvard

[N]o-fault went way beyond the old dream of reformers—the dream of
legalizing consensual divorce. No-fault was unilateral divorce. It meant that
either party, whatever the other one felt, could get out of the marriage. People
talked about marriage as a partnership. Partnership implies cooperation,
mutuality, and sharing, which is what good marriages are. But under a no-fault
system, there is no partnership at the end of a marriage. Each partner, in an
intensely personal way, chooses to stay in the marriage or go. The other partner
has no veto power, not even a power to delay.
Id.

29

Leora Friedberg, Did Unilateral Divorce Raise Divorce Rates?: Evidence from
Panel Data, 88 AM. ECON. REV. 608, 608 (1998).
30
Margaret F. Brinig & F.H. Buckley, No-Fault Laws and At-Fault People, 18 INT’L
REV. L. & ECON. 325, 326 (1998). It should be noted, as Brinig and Buckley point out, that
some of these results depend on the definition of “no-fault divorce” that is used, with some
researchers defining it to mean that fault is irrelevant to the grant of divorce, and other
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Other scholars, like Ira Mark Ellman and Sharon Lohr, argue that the rise in
the divorce rate began before the advent of no-fault divorce laws, although data
suggests that states may have experienced a short-term increase in the divorce rate
immediately after the adoption of no-fault.31 Ellman points out that “nationally,
divorce rates have been stable or declining since 1981 [which] is very difficult to
reconcile with any claim that no-fault caused any important increase in divorce
rates.”32 Many scholars believe that the rise in divorce rates throughout the 1960s
and 1970s was mainly due to significant social and cultural changes such as
increasing mobility of American families and increasing rates of employment of
wives.33
Sometime after the divorce rate rose, courts began to experience another
phenomenon: a steady increase in the number of pro se divorce litigants. In a 1994
publication, the American Bar Association Standing Committee on the Delivery of
Legal Services cited several studies documenting a steady and significant increase
in pro se divorce cases from the mid-1970s through the mid-1990s.34 Their report
noted that both poor and moderate income persons had unmet family law needs,
and that many people with moderate incomes were increasingly “turning to selfrepresentation as a method of gaining access to the divorce court.”35 A research
project sponsored by the Standing Committee in 1991 in Maricopa County,
Arizona, identified some of the elements that influenced the decision whether to
proceed pro se. Pro se litigants tended to be fairly well-educated, and were on
average younger and earned less than their lawyer-represented counterparts.36
Litigants were more likely to self-represent if they regarded their cases as
relatively “simple.”37 Thus, litigants with no minor children, litigants with no real
estate or substantial personal property, and litigants married less than ten years
were more likely to represent themselves.38 In addition, the report found that
parties who had previously represented themselves were more likely to proceed
pro se if divorcing again.39
The report noted some limitations of pro se divorces, including the
observation that pro se litigants were less likely to get help with forms, marital
counseling, dispute resolution services, or tax advice; and were less likely to

researchers defining it to mean that fault is irrelevant not only at dissolution, but also for
financial settlement. Id. at 326-28.
31
Ira Mark Ellman, Divorce in the United States, in CROSS CURRENTS: FAMILY LAW
AND POLICY IN THE US AND ENGLAND 342, 352 (Sanford N. Katz et al. eds., Oxford Univ.
Press 2000).
32
Id.
33
See, e.g., id. at 351-61.
34
ABA 1994 REPORT, supra note 2, at 5-8.
35
Id. at 1.
36
Id. at 8-10.
37
Id. at 12.
38
Id. at 9-10.
39
Id. at 10.
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request maintenance.40 However, the report also noted a bright side to pro se
divorces: there was a high satisfaction level on the part of pro se litigants, both
with the terms of the eventual divorce decrees and with the legal process.41
Although one might deduce from the list of limitations of pro se divorces that
litigants were disadvantaged by representing themselves, the report did not draw
that conclusion. The report did not evaluate the desirability of pro se divorces, but
rather accepted them as a given, and advocated for reducing the complexity of the
divorce process and offering more resources and assistance to self-represented
divorce litigants.42
In the ten-plus years that have elapsed since the 1994 ABA report, there has
been little hard data about the continuing impact of pro se status on divorce
litigants, and a paucity of data about whether self-represented divorce litigants are
disadvantaged by proceeding without lawyers.
There has, however, been some discussion in both popular and legal literature
about whether pro se clients in non-divorce contexts are disadvantaged by
representing themselves. Well-known criminal defendants such as Dr. Jack
Kevorkian, Colin Ferguson and Zacharias Moussaoui famously represented
themselves “with seemingly disastrous (and highly publicized) consequences.”43
“The media frenzies surrounding these cases, combined with the ludicrous
courtroom behavior of at least some of these defendants, has led to a perception
that defendants who represent themselves are foolish at best and mentally ill at
worst.”44
In the context of criminal defendants, the United States Supreme Court
recently held in Indiana v. Edwards45 that states can constitutionally insist upon
representation by counsel, even for defendants competent enough to stand trial
under the incompetency standard identified in Dusky v. United States.46 In Indiana,
the Court found that despite competence to stand trial, a defendant may “be unable
to carry out the basic tasks needed to present his own defense without the help of

40

Id. at 11-12.
Id. at 10-11. Notably, the report indicated similar levels of satisfaction on the part
of litigants who had been represented by lawyers.
42
See generally id. at 12-44 (recommending specific procedural and informational
services which could be offered to help self-represented divorce litigants succeed in court).
43
Erica J. Hashimoto, Defending the Right of Self-Representation: An Empirical Look
at the Pro se Felony Defendant, 85 N.C. L. Rev. 423, 425 (2007).
44
Id. at 426.
45
Indiana v. Edwards, 128 S.Ct. 2379, 2383 (2008).
46
“Dusky defines the competency standard as including both (1) ‘whether’ the
defendant has ‘a rational as well as factual understanding of the proceedings against him’
and (2) whether the defendant ‘has sufficient present ability to consult with his lawyer with
a reasonable degree of rational understanding.’” Id. (quoting Dusky v. United States, 362
U.S. 402, 402 (1960)).
41
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counsel.”47 The Court noted the usefulness of lawyers in protecting the mentally ill
defendant from humiliation resulting from self-representation at trial.48
Although the unfair disadvantage suffered by a mentally ill, self-represented
defendant may seem obvious,49 until recently there was a paucity of empirical data
either supporting or debunking the idea that litigants who represent themselves are
at a significant disadvantage.50 Measuring the relative advantages or disadvantages
of self-representation would be most straightforward in cases where success is
easily defined and only one party has the option of proceeding pro se, such as
criminal prosecutions, but even here there has been a paucity of research.51
However, recent empirical research has begun to address the question of whether
pro se representation disadvantages the litigants who choose it.
In Defending the Right of Self-Representation: An Empirical Look at the Pro
Se Felony Defendant,52 Erica J. Hashimoto challenged the “[c]onventional
wisdom” that criminal defendants who represent themselves are self-destructive
and unsuccessful. After examining three databases,53 Hashimoto concluded that
pro se defendants do not necessarily have worse outcomes than defendants who are
represented by counsel.54 Moreover, contrary to the widely held theory that
criminal defendants who represent themselves are either mentally ill or proceeding
from illegitimate motives, Hashimoto’s research suggests that pro se criminal

47

Id. at 2386.
Id. at 2387.
49
See id. The Indiana Supreme Court noted: “An amicus brief reports one
psychiatrist’s reaction to having observed a patient (a patient who had satisfied Dusky) try
to conduct his own defense: ‘[H]ow in the world can our legal system allow an insane man
to defend himself?’ Brief for Ohio et al. as Amici Curiae 24 (internal quotation marks
omitted).” Id.
50
See Hashimoto, supra note 43, at 425 (citing Martinez v. Court of Appeal, 528 U.S.
152, 164 (2000) (Breyer, J., concurring)). In the criminal context, the U.S. Supreme Court
noted the paucity of evidence on this point in 2000, stating that there was at that time “no
empirical research . . . that might help determine whether, in general, the right to represent
oneself furthers, or inhibits, the Constitution’s basic guarantee of fairness.” Id.
51
As of 2001, the only study of pro se criminal defendants was written by two
psychologists. See Douglas Mossman & Neal W. Dunseith, Jr., “A Fool for a Client”:
Print Portrayals of 49 Pro se Criminal Defendants, 29 J. AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY L. 408
(2001), available at http://www.jaapl.org/cgi/content/abstract/29/4/408. Hashimoto’s
article was the first empirical study of pro se criminal defendants to be published in the
legal literature. Hashimoto, supra note 43, at n.62.
52
Hashimoto, supra note 43, at 425.
53
Id. at 438-41 (Federal Court Database, State Court Database, and Federal
Docketing Database).
54
Hashimoto counted complete acquittals and dismissals to compute the comparative
overall success rates of represented defendants with those of pro se defendants. While
“recognizing the limitations of the databases,” she concluded that the overall success rate
was similar between the two groups across all three databases, and in some instances, better
for pro se defendants. Id. at 450, 447-54.
48
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defendants choose to self-represent “because of dissatisfaction with [courtappointed] counsel.”55
In criminal cases, the State necessarily proceeds with a lawyer. Only the
defendant has the option of obtaining representation or not. Tax cases are similarly
straightforward in the sense that one party, the IRS, is always represented by
counsel, and only the taxpayer has the option of self-representation. In addition,
taxpayers would likely agree that total success would release them from the
obligation to pay any disputed taxes or penalties, while partial success would be a
reduction in the required payments.
In Do Attorneys Do Their Clients Justice? An Empirical Study of Lawyers’
Effects on Tax Court Litigation Outcomes,56 Professor Leandra Lederman and
Senior Financial Economic Analyst Warren B. Hrung examined a random sample
of Tax Court cases to discern whether representation by counsel affected either the
financial outcome of the case or the length of time to either trial or settlement.
Their study found that attorney representation “significantly” improved the
financial outcome in cases that went to trial.57 The presence of an attorney was not
associated with better outcomes in settled cases, however.58 “The results also
suggest that taxpayers’ attorneys do not affect the amount of time Tax Court cases
take to settle or go to trial.”59 “The study thus found no support for the idea that
attorneys delay case resolutions where they are paid by the hour. Attorneys did not
close cases any faster than unrepresented litigants did, either.”60 The authors
suggest that a lawyer’s expertise may lead to better results in a trial (as opposed to
a settlement) because a lawyer’s contributions are most valuable “where the party
to be persuaded is a judge rather than a government attorney—and where
procedural expertise carries its greatest importance.”61
The research on criminal defendants and tax litigants suggests that selfrepresented litigants have, on average, a level of common sense and self-interest
that seems to lead them to make rational decisions about when they can represent
themselves without disadvantage, and when they need lawyers. The 1994 ABA
report on the needs of self-represented divorce litigants suggested on the one hand
that the high satisfaction levels of pro se litigants might indicate that they were as
well off as their lawyer-represented counterparts. On the other hand, the identified
limitations of pro se divorces, such as less help with forms and lower likelihood of
requesting maintenance, might indicate that pro se divorce litigants were at a
distinct disadvantage compared to attorney-represented divorce litigants. We
wondered: in light of developments in law and procedure since the early 1990s, are
55

Id. at 454-85.
Leandra Lederman & Warren B. Hrung, Do Attorneys do their Clients Justice? An
Empirical Study of Lawyers’ Effects on Tax Court Litigation Outcomes, 41 WAKE FOREST
L. REV. 1235 (2006).
57
Id. at 1239.
58
Id.
59
Id.
60
Id. at 1282.
61
Id. at 1281.
56
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today’s divorce litigants better off if they are represented by lawyers, or are pro se
divorce litigants equally successful?
Measuring the effect of lawyers in the divorce context presents some unique
problems. Since no entity of the State is a party in divorce proceedings, either party
can choose between a lawyer and self-representation. So we are not only
measuring the impact of a lawyer against a pro se litigant, we must also consider
the situation where two self-represented clients proceed against each other. In a
world without complete gender equity, it might matter whether it is the husband or
the wife who proceeds pro se if only one party has counsel.
We set out to compare the relative success of pro se and lawyer-represented
divorce litigants in as objective a manner as possible. Success in the criminal or tax
contexts is fairly easy to define: reduction or avoidance of penalties or taxes.
“Success” is a far more slippery concept in the context of divorce. While merely
obtaining a divorce decree was a form of success back in the days of fault-based
systems where divorces were sometimes denied, this is no longer the case.
Adoption of the no-fault divorce model led to virtually automatic grants of divorce
to any couple requesting one;62 although, ironically, the no-fault concept was
originally billed as having the exact opposite effect.63
If we cannot define success in divorce litigation as obtaining the decree, then
we must look at the terms of the decree to measure success. This too is
problematic, and infinitely idiosyncratic. We could, for example, define success as
obtaining a larger share of marital assets than the other spouse obtains. But some
clients will not be satisfied with more than the other spouse; they want much more
or all of the property. Other clients will want to get less than their spouse, possibly
because of guilt over failure of the marriage. Moreover, the actual dollar amount
may not be the real issue—certain items have symbolic or sentimental value, and
despite a low market value, such property may be the subject of a ferocious dispute
between the divorcing spouses.64 Even if we steadfastly maintain that “more” is
62

See Lawrence M. Friedman, Rights of Passage: Divorce Law in Historical
Perspective, 63 OR. L. REV. 649, 664 (1984) [hereinafter Friedman, Rights of Passage].
One disgruntled spouse can certainly obtain a divorce by asserting that the marriage is
broken, even over the other spouse’s objections. Id.
63
The Report of the Governor’s Commission on the Family (issued in 1966 as part of
the discussion leading to California’s adoption of a no-fault divorce statute) opined that the
no-fault system would “require [. . .] the Court to inquire into the whole picture of the
marriage.” Id. at 667 (citing CALIFORNIA GOVERNOR’S COMMISSION ON THE FAMILY,
REPORT OF THE GOVERNOR’S COMMISSION ON THE FAMILY 28-29 (1966)). The implication
was a court might decline to grant a divorce if the court looked at the whole picture and
decided that there was still hope for the marriage, but in fact the opposite occurred. See
generally id.
64
Disputes over the custody of pets illustrate this phenomenon. The family dog may
have little market value, and American law traditionally treats pets as property. However,
divorcing spouses may dispute Fido’s custody as vigorously as if he were a child. See Jane
Porter, Custody Battles Over Pets Look Like a Dogfight, CHI. TRIB., Oct. 1, 2006, at Q-3;
see also Ann Hartwell Britton, Bones of Contention: Custody of Family Pets, 20 J. AM.
ACAD. MATRIMONIAL LAW. 1 (2006).
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always a better result, we are faced with the reality that some divorcing spouses
illegally hide assets, so an examination of the property distribution in a divorce
may not show the real picture. Finally, obtaining data about financial settlements is
extremely difficult as it is likely not part of the public record.
Measuring success in custody is even more difficult. For one thing, many
parents would define custody success as having more contact time with the
children, but some parents would surely define success as having less time with the
kids. For another thing, the standard for custody decisions is, at least in theory, not
based on the parents’ interests at all, but rather on the best interests of the child. So
a divorce lawyer’s zealous advocacy for a client’s desired outcome might not be
expected to yield the same sort of result that might occur where the standard does
not depend on the unique characteristics of another person (the child) who is not a
party to the litigation. Finally, emphasis on custody mediation and settlement
between the parties could be expected to yield a multitude of idiosyncratic custody
outcomes which cannot be compared in terms of success or failure. Indeed, a
preliminary examination of randomly selected divorce files from our sample
revealed a range of custody solutions so diverse that they could not be categorized.
It appears that every divorcing family addresses custody in its own way.
Even more problematic from our perspective was the fact that evaluation of
success in terms of the property division or custody arrangement would best be
accomplished by a survey or interview of the satisfaction levels of the now
divorced individuals, but surveys and interviews discern subjective satisfaction
levels. We hoped to find a more objective method of comparison. One such
potential measure of success in the divorce context: is the award of spousal
maintenance, or family support, in appropriate circumstances.
Generally, spousal maintenance is awarded in the court’s discretion in divorce
cases where one spouse has significant need and the other spouse has the ability to
pay. It may sometimes be awarded in lieu of a property distribution. Payment of
maintenance has never been the norm, and it is certainly awarded in only a
minority of cases. However, Wisconsin is a state that has clear judicial doctrines
about the cases in which maintenance awards are appropriate.
Which clients are legally eligible to receive maintenance under Wisconsin
law? The Wisconsin Supreme Court has stated that a court should consider the
potential recipient’s need for support, as well as the fairness of requiring the
potential payer to provide some of that support.65 In general, maintenance could be
reasonably awarded in situations where there is a relatively long marriage,66 a
disparity in spousal incomes, and where one spouse is not capable of self-support
65

In re Marriage of LaRoque, 406 N.W. 2d 736, 741 (Wis. 1987).
We can find no authoritative definition of a “long” marriage in the cases or statutes,
as judges routinely exercise their discretion to find that marriages of different lengths are
long enough to justify an award of alimony. The average length of a first marriage ending
in divorce is eight years. See http://www.divorcereform.org/rates.html. Thus, any marriage
lasting over eight years is arguably relatively long. Later in the paper, we use fifteen years,
or nearly twice the eight-year average, as a somewhat arbitrary round figure to denote a
long marriage.
66
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at the standard of living enjoyed during the later years of the marriage.67 Normally,
any maintenance would be awarded for the length of time required for the lowerearning spouse to become self-supporting at an acceptable standard; permanent
maintenance could be awarded in cases where that is not likely to ever happen.68
Like the complex no-fault rules of yore, the maintenance doctrines are more
likely to be known and understood by lawyers. If lawyers have a positive impact
on divorce outcomes, one would expect that divorce litigants who fit the profile of
“appropriate maintenance recipients” would be more likely to obtain maintenance
if their cases are handled by lawyers. If pro se status is indeed a disadvantage and
represented status is an advantage, we would expect that appropriate maintenance
recipients would be most likely to receive maintenance if they are represented by
counsel but their spouses are not, and least likely to receive maintenance if they are
self-represented and their spouses have counsel. We would also expect few
maintenance awards where neither party is represented by counsel. Where both
parties are represented by counsel, we might expect a somewhat larger number of
maintenance awards, because lawyers may tend to encourage their clients to settle
for something within the range of what a court is likely to order. However, it may
be impossible to measure attorney effect on the maintenance issue where both
parties are represented by counsel because we have no adequate means by which to
assess the relative quality of the different lawyers.
Another measure of attorney effect can be found in the length of time the
divorce case takes from the filing of the petition to the granting of the divorce
judgment. Divorce is a painful process for most couples, and it seems reasonable to
assume that most clients would prefer to get through it as quickly as possible.
Where lawyers are involved, a longer process could also be a more expensive
process, at least if delays are due to additional attorney time spent on the case. We
are cognizant of the fact that a longer time from filing of the petition to final
judgment may also reflect factors such as the complexity of the case, the
thoroughness of the lawyers, and the indecisiveness of the parties. Nonetheless, we
believe that the impact lawyers have on the length of the divorce process is
something of interest.
Ultimately, all objective measures of lawyer effectiveness may be inadequate
because it is possible that the benefits of having a lawyer are largely intangible. If
this is the case, it would be worth knowing because it should have an impact on
how we train lawyers to work with divorcing clients.
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See generally In re Marriage of LaRoque, 406 N.W. 2d at 736 (The Court found
that the circuit court had abused its discretion in awarding the wife in a twenty-five-yearlong marriage maintenance of $1,500 per month for five months and $1,000 per month for
thirteen months. The Court remanded the case to the circuit court, instructing it to consider
whether the ex-wife could reasonably be expected, within eighteen months of divorce, to
earn enough to support herself at the marital standard of living, which the court defined as
the standard of living enjoyed in the latter years of the marriage. Id. at 741-44.).
68
Id. at 741.
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III. METHODOLOGY AND FINDINGS
A. Description of Information Gathered
Our research endeavors to answer two very general questions: (1) Why do pro
se divorce litigants choose to represent themselves? and (2) Are lawyerrepresented divorce litigants better off than self-represented divorce litigants?
Since there is no data that would directly answer these queries, we have asked
seven specific questions whose answers will provide us with important clues about
our general questions. In order to discern the reasons for self-representation in a
divorce, we asked the following questions: (1) What percentage of divorce litigants
opts to proceed pro se? and (2) What are the characteristics of individuals who
elect to represent themselves in a divorce? Examination of how pro se status
correlates with gender, age, length of marriage, income, and presence or absence of
children of the marriage may give us some clues as to why some spouses elect to
represent themselves in the divorce process, and whether the decision to selfrepresent is sensible under the circumstances.
In order to examine the possible effects of having attorney representation, we
asked another set of questions: (1) What is the average length of time between the
filing of a divorce petition and the final judgment of divorce? (2) Does lawyer
representation affect the length of the divorce process? (3) In what percentage of
divorce cases is maintenance awarded? (4) What are the characteristics of the
divorce litigants in cases where maintenance is awarded? and (5) Does lawyer
representation affect whether maintenance is granted or not? Comparing the length
of time a divorce takes with attorney representation and without representation can
provide clues about one possible effect of having legal counsel. Examination of the
characteristics of divorce litigants in cases where maintenance is granted will help
us to assess what percentage of persons who, under Wisconsin law, are reasonable
recipients of maintenance are in fact receiving it. Then we will better address the
question of lawyer effect: if lawyer representation does not correlate with
maintenance awards generally, it could be because none of the divorcing parties
are likely candidates for maintenance, and may not be a reflection of the lawyer’s
impact on the outcome. On the other hand, if likely candidates for maintenance are
no more likely to receive it despite being represented by counsel, there is a
legitimate question about what the lawyer’s impact on the case outcome is.
Our case sample was taken from Waukesha County, Wisconsin; a county with
a total population of 360,767 as of the 2000 census,69 and a 2008 estimated
population of 380,629.70 Waukesha County is adjacent to Milwaukee County, and
includes residences that could be considered suburban, urban and rural. The
69

U.S. Census Bureau, Census 2000 Demographic Profile Highlights, Waukesha
County, Wisconsin, http://factfinder.census.gov (enter “Waukesha County” in “Fast Access
to Information” search field; then follow “2000” tab) (last visited June 15, 2007).
70
U.S. Census Bureau, State & County QuickFacts, Waukesha County, Wisconsin,
http://quickfacts.census.gov/qfd/states/55/55133.html (last visited June 26, 2007).
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median family income in 1999 was $71,77371 and the 2007 median household
income was $72,432.72
We selected Waukesha County because although its residents represent a
range of living situations and incomes, the median household income is
considerably above both the median income for the state of Wisconsin and for the
United States as a whole. If there is a significant pro se movement in the divorces
of such an affluent county, we believe that it would suggest something other than
sticker shock is involved in the rejection of lawyer representation by divorce
litigants. In addition, since maintenance is rarely if ever awarded in cases where
the parties have extremely low income, we wanted to examine a population where
the median income makes maintenance a possibility for a noticeable percentage of
divorce litigants.
B. Summary of Data Collected
As described above, we first asked questions designed to give us
straightforward descriptions of what was happening in the Waukesha County
Family Court in 2005 in terms of the incidence of pro se litigants in different
identified groups. We specifically addressed the following questions: (1) what
percentage of divorce litigants opts to proceed pro se? and (2) What are the
characteristics of individuals who elect to represent themselves in a divorce?
Our research showed that 43.9% of the husbands and 37.7% of the wives
chose to proceed pro se.73 Thus, the majority of husbands (56.1%) and wives
(62.3%) had legal counsel.74 Moreover, we concluded that the relationship between
the husband’s use of counsel and the wife’s use of counsel was statistically
significant.75 In 46.4% of the divorce cases both the husband and wife had counsel
and in 27.7% of the cases both individuals were pro se. It was relatively unusual
for one spouse to have counsel and the other spouse to proceed pro se. In 9.7% of
the cases the husband had counsel and the wife did not. In 15.9% of the cases the
wife had counsel and the husband did not.
Our research also gave us important information about the characteristics of
divorce litigants who represented themselves as compared to those who chose to
hire lawyers. We first examined the characteristics of the wives who chose to have
representation compared to those who proceeded pro se. To do this, we compared
the two groups of women for: their husband’s reported gross monthly income, their
own gross monthly income, the length of their marriage (computed from date of
71

U.S. Census Bureau, Census 2000 Demographics Profile Highlights, supra note 69.
U.S. Census Bureau, State & County QuickFacts, supra note 70.
73
See infra tbl.1, app. A (showing 43.9% (n=249) of the husbands and 37.7% (n=214)
of the wives chose to represent themselves).
74
Id.
75
In other words, it was an association unlikely to occur by chance. A chi square test
of independence examining the relationship between husband and wife having counsel was
significant (χ2 (1, N = 567) = 128.83, p < .0001), indicating that there was a statistically
significant association between the spouses’ decisions to obtain counsel or not.
72
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marriage to date of divorce filing), and their age at divorce using independent ttests.76 Our data showed that women with legal counsel, compared to those without
counsel, had husbands who earned significantly more money.77 However, there
was no statistically significant difference in their own monthly income between the
women with counsel and those without counsel.78 The data also revealed that
women with counsel were married longer than were women without counsel,79 and
that women with counsel were older at the time they filed for divorce than were
those without counsel.80
Having minor children was also statistically associated with women having
counsel.81 Of the 311 women who had minor children, 67.2% had counsel82 and
32.8% were pro se.83 In contrast, of the 253 women who did not have children,
56.5% had counsel84 and 43.5% were pro se.85 In other words, women with
children were 1.58 times more likely to have a lawyer (rather than proceed pro se)
than were women without children. Our data showed that while having children
increased the likelihood of a woman having legal counsel, it did not seem to matter
how many children a woman has.86
We found similar results when we compared men who had legal counsel to
men who proceeded pro se. Compared to those without counsel, men with counsel
76

An independent sample t-test is an inferential statistical test that compares the
means of two groups (e.g., women with lawyers compared to women without lawyers). The
test determines if the means are, or are not, statistically equivalent to each other. A
“statistically significant test” indicates that the group means are different. An independent
t-test is computed to compare the two groups for each outcome variables of interest (i.e.,
income, length of marriage, etc). See FREDERICK J. GRAVETTER & LARRY B. WALLNAU,
STATISTICS FOR THE BEHAVIORAL SCIENCES 260 (6th ed., Wadsworth Publishing 2008).
77
For women with counsel, M = $5,194.41, SD = $4,800.70. For women without
counsel, M = $3,813.19, SD = $2,563.23, t(324) = 3.03, p < .01. It should be noted that the
sample size for this analysis is smaller than for the other analyses because some litigants
elected not to report their incomes in the publicly available portion of the divorce file.
78
Women with counsel: M = $3,166.67, SD = $2,050.19, women without counsel: M
= $2,948.79, SD = $2,680.82, t(316) = .82, p = .41.
79
M = 161.76 months, SD =111.53 for women with counsel, and M = 111.09 months,
SD = 88.44 for women without counsel, t(552) = 5.54, p < .001.
80
For women with counsel, M = 40.94 years, SD = 9.15, and for women without
counsel, M = 35.24 years, SD = 9.17), t(560) = 7.16, p < .001.
81
A chi square test of independence examining the relationship between the wife
having counsel and her having minor children was significant (χ2 (1, N = 564) = 6.78, p <
.01).
82
(n = 209).
83
(n = 102).
84
(n = 143).
85
(n = 110).
86
The number of minor children did not differ between women with counsel (M =
1.86, SD = .81) and without counsel (M = 1.78, SD = .77), t(314) = .87, p = .39. So, having
minor children, but not necessarily the number of children appears to be associated with
increased likelihood of women having counsel representation during the divorce.
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had a higher reported gross monthly income87 and were married longer.88 Men with
counsel were also older at the time they filed for divorce than were those without
counsel.89 The median income of the wives was similar between the group of men
that hired counsel and the group that did not, indicating that the income of the
wives did not seem to affect the decision whether to hire a lawyer.90
Having minor children was associated with men having legal counsel, just as
it was associated with women having counsel.91 Of the 311 men who had minor
children, 61.7%92 had counsel and 38.3%93 were pro se. In contrast, of the 253 men
who did not have children, 49.4%94 had counsel and 50.6%95 were pro se. In other
words, men with children were 1.65 times more likely to have a lawyer (rather than
proceed pro se) than were men without children. As with the wives, having minor
children, but not necessarily the number of children appeared to be associated with
increased likelihood of husbands having attorney representation during the
divorce.96
These results are generally consistent with the ABA Working Group data
from the early 1990s.97 For both men and women, those who represented
themselves tended to be younger, tended not to have minor children, and were
exiting relatively shorter-term marriages.98 Our data showed something slightly
different from the 1994 ABA report in terms of the effect of litigants’ income,
however. While the Working Group stated that pro se litigants earned less on
average than their lawyer-represented counterparts, our research indicated that it is
the husbands’ income that correlates with representation status for both spouses,
while the wives’ income is not so correlated.99
Next, we turned our attention to an examination of factors that might indicate
whether hiring a lawyer noticeably affects either the process or the outcome of a
87

For men with counsel, M = $5,359.59, SD = $5,049.20; for men without counsel, M
= $3,709.93, SD =$2,063.96, t(324) = 3.68, p < .01.
88
For men with counsel, (M = 157.53 months, SD =110.12), for men without counsel,
(M = 124.24 months, SD = 98.41), t(552) = 3.68, p < .001.
89
Age of men with counsel: M = 42.59 years, SD = 9.93; Age of men without
counsel: M = 39.03 years, SD = 10.16, t(560) = 4.17, p < .001.
90
There was no statistically significant difference between the men with counsel (M =
$3,166.87, SD = $2,466.88) and without counsel (M = $2,976.72, SD = $2,147.60) for
wives’ monthly income, t(316) = .73, p = .47.
91
Another chi square test of independence examining the relationship between the
husband having counsel and his having minor children was statistically significant (χ2 (1, N
= 564) = 8.62, p < .01).
92
(n = 192).
93
(n = 119).
94
(n = 125).
95
(n = 128).
96
However, the number of minor children did not differ between men with counsel
(M = 1.83, SD = .81) and without counsel (M = 1.84, SD = .77), t(314) = -.14, p = .89.
97
See supra Part II.
98
See id.
99
See supra Part III.B.
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divorce. As described above, we first investigated whether lawyer representation
affects the length of the divorce process.
Of the 567 divorce petitions examined 476, or 84%, resulted in a final
judgment of divorce. Of the cases that did not result in a divorce final judgment,
eighty-four were dismissed, two resulted in legal separation, and three were
annulled. The mean length of time between filing a divorce petition and final
judgment100 was 6.64 months, with a standard deviation of 3.10 months. The
median length of time to final judgment was 6.0 months. Thus, most cases reached
a final judgment within three to nine months, with the average length of six
months.
One possible outcome of having legal counsel is that the divorce process
might take longer than it would if a case were handled pro se. To examine this
issue, we compared the differences in length of divorce time for four situations:
when both husband and wife had counsel,101 when both were pro se,102 when only
the husband had counsel,103 and when only the wife had counsel.104 Our analysis
showed that the divorce process was significantly longer in cases where both the
husband and wife had counsel, as compared to situations where only one spouse
had counsel or neither had counsel.105 Interestingly, the mean divorce length when
both husband and wife were pro se was statistically shorter than all other
situations. However, there was no statistically significant difference in length of
divorce between situations when only the husband had counsel or when only the
wife had counsel. In sum, when both individuals have counsel the divorce length
was statistically the longest process. However, when neither individual has counsel
the divorce length was statistically the shortest process. On average, the divorce
length when both have counsel was approximately 3.75 months longer than when
both were pro se.
Next, we examined the possible effect that lawyer representation might have
on awards of spousal support. In Wisconsin, either maintenance or family support
can be awarded in divorce case decisions. As explained previously, family support
includes both maintenance and child support and, as such, provides a stream of
100

This mean length of time excludes the dismissed cases.
(n = 238).
102
(n = 135).
103
(n = 42).
104
(n = 65).
105
An analysis of variance was statistically significant (F(3, 476) = 61.19, p <.001),
and Tukey HSD post hoc tests (p < .05) indicated that when both husband and wife have
counsel (M = 8.16 months) the divorce time was significantly longer than when only the
wife has counsel (M = 5.69), only the husband has counsel (M = 6.71) or when neither have
counsel (M = 4.41). An analysis of variance (ANOVA) tests whether the means for two or
more groups are equivalent. A significant ANOVA indicates there is more variance
between the group means than is expected due to chance, thus not all means are equivalent.
Follow-up post hoc statistical tests are then used to make all possible comparisons to
determine specifically which means are different from each other. See GRAVETTER &
WALLNAU, supra note 76, at 336.
101
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income that may be used by the recipient spouse personally, as well as for childrelated expenses. We began by examining support awards that could be used
personally by the recipient spouse, and hence originally considered family support
and maintenance together. Overall, in 11.3% of the cases106 one spouse was
awarded either family support or maintenance. In 8.6% of the cases maintenance
was awarded,107 in 12.5% of the cases maintenance was left open,108 in one case
the decision of maintenance was still pending arbitration, and maintenance was not
awarded in 78.1% of the cases.109 Family support was awarded in 2.6% of the
cases,110 left open in 0.7% of the cases,111 and was not awarded in 96.1% of the
cases.112 In no case did someone receive both maintenance and family support;
however, in seven cases where family support was awarded, maintenance decisions
were left open.
C. Characteristics of the Maintenance and Family Support Awards
We found that the husband was the payor of maintenance and family support
in all but two of the cases. 113 Fifty-eight percent114 of the award decisions were for
a set number of months, with the mean length of the awards being 60.69 months,115
and the median length of awards being fifty-one months. The mean monthly
payment in these cases was $1,767.80. There was a great deal of variation in the
duration of the support awards. 17%116 of the awards were for permanent
maintenance or family support. Eight percent117 of the awards were tied to the
fulfillment of certain conditions, and were payable until events such as until
finishing a college degree, obtaining full-time employment, retiring or selling the
family home. Another 15.6% of the awards had a payment that was variable over
time,118 and one person had a fixed, one-time payment award.119
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(n = 64).
(n = 49).
108
(n = 71).
109
(n = 443).
110
(n = 15).
111
(n = 4).
112
(n = 545).
113
See infra tbl.2 (summarizing the characteristics of the maintenance and family
support decisions).
114
(n = 37).
115
(SD = 38.91).
116
(n = 11).
117
(n = 5).
118
(n = 10).
119
It is highly unusual to characterize a one time payment as support rather than
property division, and we can only speculate as to why this was done, although we suspect
that the choice may have been made for tax reasons.
107
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To investigate the characteristics of divorce litigants in cases where pure
maintenance120 was awarded, we conducted a series of analysis of variance to
compare three groups (those where maintenance had been awarded, those where
maintenance was not awarded, and those where maintenance had been left open)
for differences in husbands’ gross monthly income, wives’ gross monthly income,
length of marriage, length of divorce, age of husband, and age of wife.121
We found that maintenance awards were associated with husbands earning a
higher gross income, but were not associated with variations in the wives’
incomes.122 We also found that length of marriage significantly differed across the
three groups.123 The couples in cases where maintenance was not awarded were
married significantly less time than were the couples in the cases where
maintenance was awarded or the decision was left open.124
Age of the litigants was also significantly different across the three groups.
Husbands were significantly older in cases where maintenance was awarded than
when it was not awarded, however the husbands’ age in cases where maintenance
was left open did not differ from the other two groups.125 Likewise, the wives’ age
differed across the three groups126 such that wives were significantly older in cases
where maintenance was awarded than in cases where maintenance was not
awarded, and the age of wives in cases left open did not differ from the other two
groups. The data showed that the length of the divorce process127 was significantly
shorter for cases where maintenance was not awarded than the length of time for
both cases where maintenance was awarded and left open.128

120

As opposed to family support which could properly be used for the support of
either the spouse or the children.
121
Tukey HSD post hoc tests (p < .05 criteria) were used to determine specific group
differences. Table 3 provides descriptive means. See infra tbl.3.
The analyses with husbands and wives income have smaller sample sizes due to
missing data for the reports of income, and thus these analyses should be interpreted with
caution. For the analysis with husbands’ income, there were thirty-seven cases with
reported income where maintenance was left open, and there were 255 cases with reported
income where no maintenance was awarded. For the analysis with wives’ income, there
were twenty-eight cases with reported income where maintenance was awarded, 250 cases
with reported income where maintenance was not awarded, and thirty-nine cases with
reported income where the maintenance decision was left open.
122
See infra tbl.3. We found that husbands made significantly more money in cases
where maintenance was granted (M = $6,961.30) than in cases where they were not granted
(M = $4,313.91).
123
(F(2, 468) = 26.71, p < .001) and Tukey HSD post hoc tests indicated that couples
had been married significantly longer in cases where maintenance was awarded than when
it was denied or left open.
124
Id.
125
(F(2, 476) = 10.21, p < .001). Tukey HSD post hoc (p < .05) used.
126
(F(2, 476) = 12.71, p < .001). Tukey HSD post hoc (p < .05) used.
127
Computed as the time between filing a petition and judgment dates.
128
(F(2, 476) = 13.63, p < .001).
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Finally, although the presence of minor children of the marriage did not make
the award of maintenance more likely, it appears that cases were more likely to
have maintenance decisions left open when minor children were involved.129
To investigate the characteristics of divorce litigants in cases where family
support was awarded we conducted a similar series of analysis to compare those
cases where family support had been awarded to those where family support was
not awarded. Only three cases had decisions on support left open and so those
cases were not included in the following analyses due to the small sample size.
Table 4 provides a summary of the descriptive means and test statistics.130
The findings indicate that the husband’s average gross monthly income was
noticeably higher in cases where family support was awarded than when it was not
awarded.131 We found that the length of the marriage was significantly longer in
cases where family support was awarded than when it was not awarded.132
Furthermore, the length of time for the divorce was significantly longer when
family support was awarded than in cases where family support was not
awarded.133 There were no statistically significant differences between the groups
for age of wife, age of husband, or wife’s gross monthly income.
As expected (given the fact that family support is defined as a combination of
spousal and child support), there was an association between having minor
children and being awarded family support.134 Specifically, in all of the fifteen
cases where family support was awarded, there were minor children in the
marriage. In the cases with minor children, 6% were awarded family support,135
and 94% of the cases136 were not awarded family support.137
129

A chi square test of independence also indicates that maintenance awards were
associated with there being minor children in the marriage (χ2 (2, N = 480) = 8.60, p < .05).
Of cases with minor children (n = 254), 10.2% (n = 26) were awarded maintenance, 19.3%
(n = 49) had maintenance decisions left open, and 70.5% (n = 179) were not awarded
maintenance. However, for couples without minor children (n = 226), 10.2% (n = 23) were
awarded maintenance, 9.7% (n = 22) were left open, and 80% (n = 181) were not awarded
maintenance.
130
See infra tbl.4.
131
The husband’s average gross monthly income was $9,994.68 in the fifteen cases
where family support was awarded compared to an average gross monthly income of
$4,451.15 cases where family support was not awarded.
132
An average marriage length of 205.20 months in cases where family support was
awarded compared to an average marriage length of 138.77 months in cases where family
support was not awarded.
133
The average length of the divorce process was 8.40 months in cases where family
support was awarded compared to an average divorce process time of 6.58 months in cases
where family support was not awarded.
134
(χ2 (1, N = 477) = 13.94, p < .001).
135
(n = 15).
136
(n = 236).
137
Family support was never awarded in cases where there were no minor children,
which is consistent with the definition of family support as being a combination of spousal
and child support.
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Next, we examined how lawyer representation was associated with
maintenance awards by computing a chi square test of independence between the
four types of cases (both have counsel, only husband has counsel, only wife has
counsel, and both spouses were pro se) and maintenance decisions (maintenance
awarded, maintenance not awarded, decision left open). We found an association
between lawyer status and maintenance award outcomes.138 Specifically, both
husband and wife had counsel in 77.6% of those cases where maintenance was
awarded.139 In 12.2% of the cases awarding maintenance only the wife had
counsel,140 and in 10.2% of the cases awarding maintenance, neither had
counsel.141 Maintenance was never awarded in the cases where only the husband
had counsel. We found a similar pattern in the seventy-one cases where
maintenance decisions were left open. In 69.0% of those cases both husband and
wife had counsel,142 in 14.1% of the cases only the wife had counsel,143 in 12.7%
of the cases neither had counsel,144 and in 4.2% of the cases where maintenance
was left open, only the husband had counsel.145
In contrast, both husband and wife had counsel in 41.9% of those cases where
maintenance was not awarded.146 In 13.6% of the cases not awarding maintenance,
only the wife had counsel, in 33.6% of those cases neither had counsel, and in
10.8% of those cases only the husband had counsel.147 Based on these findings it
appears that maintenance was most likely to be awarded in cases where both
husband and wife had representation.
Due to the small number of cases where family support was awarded, similar
chi-square analyses could not be accurately computed. Of the fifteen cases where
family support was awarded, both the husband and the wife had counsel in twelve
cases. In two cases, neither spouse had counsel. In one case, only the wife had
counsel.148

138

A chi square test of independence tests whether there is an association between
two variables. See GRAVETTER & WALLNAU, supra note 76, at 483. This chi square test
was statistically significant indicating an association between lawyer status and
maintenance award decisions (χ2 (6, N = 480) = 40.66, p < .001). Table 5 presents the
percent of cases within the maintenance decisions that fell into the four types of
representation categories. See infra tbl.5.
139
In other words, maintenance was awarded in thirty-eight out of the forty-nine cases
where both the husband and the wife had counsel.
140
(n = 6).
141
(n = 5).
142
(n = 49).
143
(n = 10).
144
(n = 9).
145
(n = 3).
146
In other words, both the husband and the wife had counsel in 151 of the 360 cases
where maintenance was not awarded.
147
See infra tbl.5.
148
In other words, both the husband and the wife had counsel in 80% of the cases
where family support was ordered, and neither had counsel in 13.3% of the cases.
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A final question that remains unanswered is whether clients who are legally
eligible to receive maintenance under Wisconsin law are helped or harmed by
having counsel or proceeding pro se. As discussed above, Wisconsin law envisions
maintenance in cases where, after a relatively long marriage one spouse needs
additional income to continue at the marital standard of living, and the other
spouse can afford to pay some income for that purpose.149 Since we cannot directly
assess the marital standard of living, we have limited ourselves to the pre-divorce
family income.150 Specifically, we were interested in the cases in our sample of
couples who were divorcing after fifteen or more years of marriage151 and who had
a disparity of income. Of the forty-nine cases where maintenance was awarded,
55.1% of the couples152 had been married for fifteen years or more. We also found
that the earning disparity between spouses was significantly larger in cases where
maintenance was awarded (M = $4,035.81) than when maintenance was not
awarded (M = $1,250.55).153
Due to the small sample size of maintenance cases we could not compute a
chi square test of association between counsel and maintenance decisions.
However, in 77.8% of the cases where maintenance was awarded, both husband
and wife had counsel.154 In 11.1% of the cases only the wife had counsel, and in
11.1% of the cases, neither had counsel.155 There was no case in which
maintenance was awarded when only the husband had counsel.

149

See In re Marriage of LaRoque, 406 N.W. 2d 736 (Wis. 1987).
It should be noted that divorce litigants are not required to disclose their incomes
in the part of the file that is a public record. Many report it in the public part of the file
anyway, and our analysis on this point is based on the income numbers for couples who
chose to publicly report.
Obviously, family income is only a rough approximation of the standard of living
enjoyed by the couple, since wealthy couples could live frugally and poor couples could
live beyond their means.
151
(n = 143 couples).
152
(n = 27).
153
To examine the relationship between earning disparity and maintenance awards for
this sample of couples who had been married at least fifteen years, a disparity of income
variable was computed as the difference between the husband and wife’s reported income
(higher numbers indicate how much more the husband makes than the wife). An
independent t-test was computed to compare the earning disparity between the cases where
maintenance was awarded and cases where maintenance was not awarded, t(68) = 3.13, p <
.001. Missing data is again an issue with these analyses. There are thirteen cases in the
maintenance group and fifty-seven cases in the no maintenance group that reported income,
so these analyses should be interpreted with caution.
154
(n = 22).
155
For cases where only the wife had counsel, n = 3, and in cases where neither had
counsel, n = 3.
150
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IV. DISCUSSION OF IMPLICATIONS OF FINDING
Our data provides us with important clues about the reasons for selfrepresentation in divorce, as well as clues about the effects of having lawyer
representation. Although our research data cannot answer all questions, it does
suggest that lawyers and law schools may need to approach education about
divorce practice in new ways in order to best serve divorce litigants.
A. Why do Divorce Litigants Represent Themselves?
Our data supported the popular notion that the decision about whether or not
to hire divorce counsel is often based on financial considerations, since both
husbands and wives were more likely to have counsel as the husbands’ income
increased.156 Increases in the wives’ income did not seem to impact the decision of
whether or not to hire a lawyer, however, there are probably factors involved in the
decision other than whether there was enough money to pay an attorney fee and
whether or not there was any property to divide.157 We can only speculate, but one
possibility is that both husbands and wives feel a strong sense of entitlement to the
husband’s income, perhaps because of social traditions of the husband being the
primary breadwinner. Husbands may feel a stronger need to protect their
ownership of their own incomes, but may not feel as entitled to pursue their wives’
earnings. Wives may feel a greater need to have income from the husband in order
to maintain the marital standard of living, and they may feel entitled to some sort
of stipend based on whatever child-rearing or homemaking services they have
provided during the marriage. Whatever the reason, the litigants appeared more
motivated to hire counsel as the husbands’ gross income increased.
There were also non-monetary factors associated with the decision to hire
counsel. Both men and women who hired counsel were older and had been married
longer at the time the divorce was filed than were men and women who proceeded
pro se. Again, we can only speculate, but a couple of possibilities are apparent.
Age and length of marriage both suggest higher levels of education, either formal
or through life experience.158 Greater experience might make a person more
receptive to the sort of expert advice provided by a lawyer, and it might make a
person more aware of the sorts of complications that might make such advice

156

See supra Part III.B.
Since property valuations are in the part of the file that is not public record, we
have no data on whether or not there was significant property to divide in any of these
cases. We mean to suggest only that accumulation of property can result from either the
husband or the wife’s income, and the fact that the husband’s income is associated with
lawyer representation status, but the wife’s income is not suggests that other factors are at
play.
158
We were not able to gather data on the levels of formal education attained by the
litigants.
157

2010]

DIVORCE CASE STUDY

81

desirable.159 People who have been married longer may feel that they have more
invested in the relationship, and hence might seek help in order to leave the
relationship as advantageously as possible. People who are older or have been
married longer might also feel that they have more to lose, such as accumulated
property, and may be more willing to invest in a lawyer in order to protect
whatever property they share with their spouses.
We also found that both men and women were more likely to have legal
counsel when there were minor children in the marriage.160 This pattern may
reflect a consciousness that there are important interests at stake, such as time with
the children or preservation of decision-making authority with respect to the
children. Hiring counsel may reflect a desire to protect those interests, and a
willingness to make a financial sacrifice in order to achieve that protection. Parents
of minor children may also hire lawyers in the hopes of having a smoother process
with better results that will protect their children from losing important
relationships or economic benefits that have been enjoyed during the marriage.
It should be noted that factors such as higher husband income, longer
marriage and minor children are all factors that complicate resolution of legal
issues in a divorce, and may make self-representation inadvisable. On the other
hand, litigants with lower incomes, shorter marriages and no minor children may
indeed be able to adequately handle their cases pro se. It appears, therefore, that
many litigants have realistic ideas about when they need lawyers and when they do
not, and that these litigants act accordingly.
B. Do Lawyers Make a Difference?
Our data showed that the divorce process was longest when both parties were
represented by legal counsel and shortest when both parties were pro se.161 Since
longer cases generally cost more, it is possible that lawyers deliberately extend the
process so as to collect higher fees. However, as described above, the divorce
litigants who are most likely to hire counsel are the litigants with complicating
factors such as higher husband income, longer marriage and minor children. Since
the issues raised by these factors typically take time to resolve, it is likely that
lawyers are not causing the delays, even though the methods of resolution
employed by lawyers do take more time.
It is difficult to assess the impact of lawyers in relation to maintenance
awards. We found that maintenance was most likely to be awarded when both the
husband and the wife had legal counsel, although approximately 10% of the
maintenance awards were in cases where neither party had counsel.162 One
159

However, as noted earlier in this article, data compiled by the ABA Working
Group indicated that pro se litigants were “reasonably well-educated, with most having
some college.” ABA 1994 REPORT, supra note 2, at 9.
160
See supra Part III.B.
161
See id.
162
See id.
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possibility is that the presence of lawyers makes a maintenance award more likely,
because lawyers understand when a judge might award maintenance under
Wisconsin law, and encourage their clients to settle for something that would be
reasonable under the law. It is also possible that litigants have a basic instinct
about when maintenance is a reasonable likelihood, and that those litigants are
more likely to hire lawyers to negotiate more favorable terms for the maintenance.
Under this theory, the lawyers would not make it more likely that clients would get
or pay maintenance, rather, the lawyers would have input into the terms of the
maintenance agreement.
We are cognizant of the fact that we did not measure all possible lawyer
effects on the divorce process. It is possible, for example, that persons who are
represented by counsel have different satisfaction levels with the divorce process
than do people who represent themselves. We considered, but decided against, the
collection of data about one objective method for assessing post-divorce
satisfaction; namely, the number of post-judgment actions initiated by the divorced
parties. Presumably, people who are satisfied with their divorce outcomes would
carry on their post-divorce lives without revisiting and re-litigating past
grievances, while dissatisfied people would attempt to re-litigate in the hopes of
obtaining a more favorable outcome the second time around. The structure of
current Wisconsin divorce law, however, largely prevents extensive post-judgment
actions, except in limited circumstances involving child custody. Specifically,
property distributions and waivers and denials of maintenance are final.163 Custody
orders cannot be reopened until at least two years have passed since the initial
custody order, except in cases where the child is at serious risk of significant
harm.164 While the family court decisions are appealable (like those of any trial
court), in fact only a small percentage of litigants appeal portions of their divorce
orders, and the number who do so without lawyers is likely to be so small that no
useful data could be gleaned.
Subjective satisfaction with divorce outcomes could also be measured by
interviews or surveys. In this study, we tried to limit ourselves to objective rather
than subjective data, such as the sort of oral or written surveys of divorced persons
that might discern their satisfaction levels after their divorces. The data reported by
the ABA Working Group in the early 1990s suggested that many pro se litigants
have high levels of satisfaction.165 A fruitful area for future research might be the
examination of satisfaction levels at this point in time, after developments in court
processes, divorce law and society.
CONCLUSION
The widespread phenomenon of pro se divorce litigation is undoubtedly here
to stay, and that may not be a bad thing for many litigants. It appears that many
163

WIS. STAT. § 767.59(1)(c)(b) (2006).
WIS. STAT. § 767.45(1)(a) (2006).
165
ABA 1994 REPORT, supra note 2, at 10-11.
164
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divorcing couples are accurate in their assessment of whether they need lawyers or
not. Lawyers are increasingly being relegated to more complex cases involving
long-term marriages, significant property, higher income, and minor children. To
the extent that lawyers handle “simple” divorces, their role as buffers from the
conflict may be more important than their legal expertise. Law school curriculums
may need to adjust to the changing needs of divorce clients by providing more
education on conflict resolution and client counseling on the one hand, and more
detailed instruction on the kinds of property and custody disputes that are likely to
result in lawyer involvement on the other hand. Thus, legal education should
prepare lawyers to help their clients psychologically by reducing stress and conflict
during the divorce process, as well as by providing the sophisticated analysis and
handling of the complex legal issues for which a lawyer’s expertise is most often
sought.
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APPENDIX A
Table 1. Percent and number of husbands and wives who have legal counsel or
proceed pro se.
Wife had counsel
n = 353 (62.3%)

Wife pro se
n = 214 (37.7%)

Husband had counsel
n = 318 (56.1%)

n = 263
46.4%

n = 55
9.7%

Husband pro se
n = 249 (43.9%)

n = 90
15.9%

n = 159
27.7%

Table 2. Characteristics of awards.
Type of
payment*

Frequency

Percent**

Permanent

11

17.2

Set # months

37

57.8

Conditional
***

5

7.8

Variable
payment****

10

15.6

Length of
payment in
months
Indefinitely

Mean = 60.69
SD = 38.58
Median = 51
Range 7 to 156

Amount of monthly
payment
Mean = $1,260.73
SD = $1,035.85
Median = $1,500
Range $200 to $3,500
Mean = $1,767.80
SD = $2,084.75
Median = $1,000
Range $140 - $7,500
Mean = $2,614.80
SD = $2,170.22
Median = $2,674.00
Range $250 to $6,000

Mean = 136.90
SD = 106.28
Median = 89.50
Range 34 to 339

Weighted mean =
$2,349.20
SD = $1,519.81
Median = $2,411.50
Range = $509 to
$5,718
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Table Notes
* One person received a one-time payout of $14,000. This payment was not
included in any of the calculations for mean payments or length of award.
** This percent is of the number of people who received either a maintenance
or family support award (n = 64).
*** Conditional awards were monthly payments until some specified event,
such as bachelor’s degree completion, full-time employment, retirement, or sale of
a home. Thus, length of payment was not computable.
**** Variable payments changed, generally decreasing in value, overtime. To
compute the mean monthly payment, the monthly payments were weighted by the
number of months to allow for the computation of weighted values. Thus, this
reflects the average monthly award, recognizing that some months had higher
payments and some months have lower payments than this weighted mean.
Table 3.
Maintenance
awarded

Maintenance left
open

Maintenance
not awarded

F-statistic

Husband’s
gross
monthly
income
Wives’ gross
monthly
income

$6,961.30

$4,793.88

$4,313.91

F(2, 320) = 5.98, p < .01

$2,683.30

$2,540.97

$3,211.20

F(2, 314) = 1.86, p = .16

Length of
marriage (in
months)

225.43

172.97

121.99

F(2, 468) = 26.71,
p <.001

Age of wife
(in years)

43.63

41.16

37.41

F(2, 476) = 12.71,
p < .001

Age of
husband (in
years)

46.06

42.74

39.71

F(2, 476) = 10.21,
p < .001

Length of
divorce (in
months)

8.02

7.77

6.22

F(2, 476) = 13.63,
p < .001

Note. Degrees of freedom for gross monthly income vary from total sample size
due to missing data in Table 3.
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Table 4.
Family Support
awarded

Family
Support not
awarded

F-statistic

Husband’s gross
monthly income

$9,994.68

$4,451.15

F(1, 319) = 18.53, p < .01

Wives’ gross
monthly income

$2,152.61

$3,099.39

F(1, 313) = .97, p = .33

Length of
marriage (in
months)
Age of wife (in
years)

205.20

138.77

F(1, 466) = 5.64, p < .05

41.71

38.56

F(1, 474) = 1.48, p = .22

Age of husband
(in years)

44.29

40.71

F(1, 474) = 1.65, p = .20

Length of
divorce (in
months)

8.40

6.58

F(1, 474) = 5.05, p < .05

Note. Degrees of freedom for gross monthly income vary from total sample size
due to missing data. Due to the small sample size of cases being awarded family
support (and missing data for monthly income), these findings should be
interpreted with caution.
Table 5. Percentage of cases within each maintenance award decision that fell into
each legal representation category.

Maintenance
awarded (n =
49)
Maintenance
not award (n =
360)
Decision left
open
(n = 71)

Both have
counsel
(n = 238)
77.6%
n = 38

Wife only has
counsel (n =
65)
12.2%
n=6

Husband only
has counsel (n
= 42)
0%
n=0

Neither have
counsel (n =
135)
10.2%
n=5

41.9%
n = 151

13.6%
n = 49

10.8%
n = 39

33.6%
n = 121

69.0%
n = 49

14.1%
n = 10

4.2%
n=3

12.7%
n=9

Note. Cases where family support was awarded are not included in this table.

